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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) and Rules 5 and 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court err in excluding evidence of severance damages based on loss of 
view from the remaining property? 
Standard of Review: The decision of the trial court to exclude evidence of severance 
damages based on loss of view from the remaining property is reviewed on appeal for 
correctness. See Ivers v. Utah Dept. of Transp.. 2007 UT 19, f 7, 154 P.3d 802 ("Because 
the issue before this court is a question of law related to constitutional and statutory 
interpretation, we review the court of appeals' ruling for correctness."); accord Utah Dept. 
of Transp. v. Ivers. 128 P.3d 74, f 9, 2005 UT App 519. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") filed its Complaint in this 
case(CaseNo. 970905361) on July 31, 1997, seekingtocondemnaportionof property (the 
"Mark Property") then owned by Mark Investment Company for purposes of the 1-15 
reconstruction project. (R. 11-20.) On August 1, 1997, UDOT filed its Complaint in Case 
No. 970905368 seeking to condemn a portion of the neighboring piece of property, which 
was owned by Admiral for purposes of the I-15 reconstruction project. (R. 1-10.) Admiral 
subsequently purchased the Mark property from Mark Investment Company. As a result, on 
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July 14, 1999, the trial court entered an order consolidating Case No. 970905368 into this 
case, Case No. 970905361. (R. 98-99.) 
Over the years, the resolution of the case has been delayed for a number of reasons. 
For instance, in August of 1999, the trial court stayed all proceedings so that the parties could 
arbitrate the case. (R. 100-101.) In October of 2000, however, the arbitration proceedings 
were terminated. (R. 102-04.) From 2001 to 2004, the parties stipulated on multiple 
occasions to extend the discovery and motion deadlines. (R. 114-15, 121-28, 134-141.) In 
early 2005, the parties eventually filed cross motions in limine regarding the type of evidence 
that would be admissible to prove Admiral's severance damages. (R. 151-163, 168-189.) 
Following oral argument, on October 31, 2005, Judge Stephen L. Roth entered a 
Memorandum Decision and Order, wherein he granted UDOT' s motion in limine and denied 
Admiral's cross motion in limine ("Judge Roth's Order"). (Addendum Tab 1) (R. 492-502.) 
Because Judge Roth's Order involved unique legal issues of first impression in Utah, 
he subsequently certified his ruling for appeal under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (R. 522-23.) However, on August 10, 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals 
dismissed Admiral's appeal without prejudice stating that Judge Roth's Order was "not an 
order eligible for certification under rule 54(b)." (R. 556-59.) Following the dismissal of 
Admiral's appeal, the case was assigned to the Honorable Robert P. Faust. 
In mid to late 2007, UDOT filed a series of motions in limine seeking to exclude 
evidence at trial relating to, among other things, Admiral's severance damages caused by the 
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loss of view and visibility. (R. 656-64, 733-35,. 780-82.) On December 27, 2007, the trial 
court entered a Minute Entry, wherein it granted UDOT's motions in limine (the "Minute 
Entry"). (Addendum Tab 2) (R. 862-64.) The practical effect of the trial court's Minute 
Entry was that it disposed of Admiral's claims for severance damages. See id. 
On January 10, 2008, Admiral petitioned for permission to pursue an interlocutory 
appeal from Judge Faust's Minute Entry. (R. 872-74.) On January 30,2008, the Utah Court 
of Appeals issued its order granting Admiral permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal on 
the following issue: "Whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of severance 
damages based on loss of view from the remaining property." (R. 895.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Admiral property is located adj acent to I-15 in an area that is probably the 
most heavily traveled in the intermountain area. The volume of traffic on that section of I-15 
did not change significantly from before to after the filing and the take in this case. (R. 664, 
759.) 
2. UDOT condemned a portion of the property (the "Take") to enlarge and 
reconstruct portions of the 1-15 freeway. The enlargement and reconstruction of I-15 in the 
manner proposed by UDOT necessarily included elevated traffic lanes, a relocated frontage 
road and installation of a large storm drain. (R. 11-20, 664, 670-71, 994 at 29.) 
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3. The area of the Take consisted of the eastern portion of Admiral's property 
adjacent to the 500 West frontage road prior to the freeway reconstruction. The new frontage 
road and the storm drain were installed on the property taken. See id. 
4. At the time of the Take, the traffic lanes of I-15 were elevated approximately 
2 feet higher than the ground surface of Admiral's property. Thus, prior to the 
condemnation, Admiral's property enjoyed a virtually unlimited view to the northeast, the 
east and the southeast and was fully visible from both northbound and southbound lanes of 
1-15. (R. 993 at 8-9.) 
5. The reconstruction resulted in the present traffic lanes of the freeway and the 
frontage road and storm drain being located closer to the structures on Admiral's remaining 
property (the "Remainder"). See Id. 
6. Additionally, the reconstructed freeway is elevated considerably higher, with 
a portion of the freeway wall reaching a height of approximately 28 feet at a point about six 
inches outside of the Take. As a result, the Admiral property is now located in a hole, with 
1-15 obstructing the air, light and view both to and from the property. (R. 993 at 8-9,16,42; 
994 at 12-14, 25-26.) 
7. Admiral retained the services of a real estate appraiser, Jerry R. Webber, to 
prepare an appraisal of the fair market value of the Take and also to determine the severance 
damages caused to the Remainder by the 1-15 reconstruction. (R. 773.) 
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8. Mr. Webber made three appraisals of the property, previously designated as 
Lots 16 and 17, which is the subject of the above-referenced case. See id. 
9. The first appraisal, concerning the fair market value of Lot 16 and Lot 17, was 
dated November 25,1994. Admiral purchased Lot 17 in March of 1995, based upon the fair 
market value as reflected in that appraisal. See id. 
10. Mr. Webber made a second appraisal that concerned the fair market value of 
Lot 16 in October of 1997. Admiral purchased that property in July of 1998, based upon the 
fair market value as reflected in that appraisal. See id. 
11. In his role as an expert witness, Mr. Webber prepared a third appraisal that 
concerned the fair market value of both Lots 16 and 17 in September of 2007. A copy of that 
appraisal was provided to UDOT and is the subject of this appeal. (R. 733-35,773,862-64.) 
12. In each of the three appraisals, Mr. Webber took into account all of the factors 
i hat are usually and customarily taken into account by a willing buyer and seller, including 
dew from and visibility of the property. (R. 774.) 
13. Mr. Webber determined the value of the Take based upon factors existing 
mmediately prior to the condemnation. (R. 772-75.) 
14. He then determined Admiral's severance damages to the Remainder, using 
factors consistent with his prior appraisals of the same property, based upon all of the factors 
that a prudent and willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would take into 
account in arriving at market value, including but not limited to, view and visibility. See id. 
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15. Mr. Webber was unable despite extensive study and effort to identify 
comparable sales that did not take into account both view from the property and visibility of 
the property from 1-15. (R. 760, 774.) 
16. As a licensed appraiser, Mr. Webber cannot speculate as to such values, which 
can vary widely from one property to another, and cannot be justified with true comparables 
generally used and accepted in appraisal practices. See id. 
17. Moreover, to eliminate either the value of view or visibility or both, as occurred 
here, from fair market value would provide a very significant windfall in the amount of that 
value to UDOT at Admiral's expense because that value was specifically included in the 
price Admiral paid for the same properties prior to the Take. (R. 760-61, 774-75.) 
18. UDOT filed a series of motions in limine seeking to exclude evidence at trial 
relating to, among other things, Admiral's severance damages and the testimony of 
Mr. Webber on the subject of severance damages relating to view and visibility. (R. 656-64, 
733-35,780-82.) 
19. On December 27, 2007, the trial court entered a Minute Entry, wherein it 
granted UDOT's motions in limine. In its Minute Entry, the trial court referred to and 
specifically adopted Judge Roth's Order dated October 31,2005. The practical effect of the 
trial court's Minute Entry was that it disposed of Admiral's claims for severance damages. 
(R. 862-64.) 
6 
20. In early 2007, the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in Ivers v. Utah 
Dept.ofTransp., 2007 UT 19,154 P.3d 802, essentially rewriting important rules regarding 
severance damages related to loss of view and visibility. The trial court's Minute Entry does 
not address, and in some respects conflicts with, the Supreme Court's ruling in Ivers. See 
id. 
21. On January 10, 2008, Admiral petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for 
permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's Minute Entry. (R. 872-
74.) 
22. On January 17, 2008, the Utah Supreme Court transferred this matter to this 
Court pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
23. On January 30, 2008, the Court issued its order granting Admiral permission 
to pursue an interlocutory appeal on the following issue: "Whether the trial court erred in 
excluding evidence of severance damages based on loss of view from the remaining 
property." (R. 895.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's Minute Entry, which excludes evidence of severance damages based 
upon loss of view from Admiral's remaining property, is flawed for multiple reasons. First, 
the ruling conflicts with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Ivers v. UtahDept. of Transp.. 
2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802. Second, the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of 
severance damages based on loss of view will allow UDOT to reap a windfall at Admiral's 
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expense. Third, it is impossible for Admiral to segregate its loss of view damages from its 
overall severance damage amount. And finally, the trial court had both the discretion and an 
obligation to correct Judge Roth's Order, which was incorrect as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, the Court should reverse the trial court's December 27,2007 Minute Entry and 
remand this matter for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF SEVERANCE 
DAMAGES RASED ON LOSS OF VIEW FROM THE REMAINING PROPERTY. 
In its December 27, 2007 Minute Entry, the trial court granted UDOT's motions in 
limine, ruling as follows: 
UDOT' s Motions in Limine on the issue of view and visibility and concerning 
Jerry R. Webber's testimony on the subject of severance damages caused by 
loss of view and visibility was [sic] heard by the Court on December 18,2007, 
at 10:00 a.m. After hearing arguments thereon, review of the pleadings and a 
specific review of the Decision dated October 31st, 2005 issued by Judge Roth 
in this case, the Court grants UDOT's Motions in Limine. The Court also 
refers the parties to Judge Roth's decision and adopts the same here. 
Defendant is able to assert claims for any severance damages relating to 
abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner to 500 West. 
This Minute Entry will stand as the Order of the Court. 
December 27, 2007 Minute Entry at 1-2. 
For the reasons set forth below, the trial court erred in excluding evidence of 
Admiral's severance damages based upon loss of view from the remaining property. 
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A. The trial court's decision to exclude evidence of severance damages based 
on loss of view conflicts with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Ivers 
v.UtahDeptofTransp.. 2007 UT 19,154 P.3d 802. 
In February of 2007, the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in Ivers v. Utah Dept. 
of Transp.,2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802, essentially rewriting important rules regarding 
severance damages relating to loss of view and visibility. The Utah Supreme Court declared 
that "existing Utah law does recognize an easement of view from one's property as a 
protectable property right." Id. at f 16. The trial court's Minute Entry in this case fails to 
address, and in some respects is directly contrary to, the Ivers decision. 
In Ivers, just like the present case, UDOT argued that the landowner was not entitled 
to any damages for loss of view because "[n]o portion of the raised highway, its footings, or 
its foundation was constructed on the condemned land; rather, the condemned land was used 
for the creation of the frontage road and for improvements to Shephard Lane." Id. at f 3. 
Despite this fact, the court in Ivers ruled that loss of view severance damages are appropriate 
"when the view-impairing structure is built on land other than the condemned land, but the 
condemned land is used as part of a single project and that use is essential to completion of 
the project." Id. at f 26. 
It would be difficult to find a case more on point with the present case than Ivers. In 
that case: 
[T]he State condemned a 0.048-acre portion of Arby's 0.416-acre lot in order 
to build a one-way frontage road parallel to, and connecting with, the newly 
widened and elevated highway. 
* * * 
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No portion of the raised highway, its footings, or its foundation was 
constructed on the condemned land; rather, the condemned land was used for 
the creation of the frontage road and for improvements to Shephard Lane. 
# * * 
The elevation of the highway has obstructed both the view to the east from 
Arby's land and the visibility of Arby's property from the highway. 
# * * 
[T]he pursuant loss of view and visibility, diminished the market value of the 
remaining land. 
Id. at ff 2-5. After reviewing the facts, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
ITIhe raised highway . . . was not built in any part on the condemned portion 
of Arby's land. Rather, the condemned land was used for the construction of 
a small portion of the frontage road. The frontage road itself causes no 
damage to the view from Arby's remaining land. However.... the land was 
condemned as part of UDOT's plan to raise the highway and was therefore 
condemned as part of a single project. 
Whether severance damages are awardable hinges on whether the severance 
of the condemned property, and the use of that property, caused damage to the 
remaining property. Utah Code section 78-34-10(2) describes severance 
damages as those damages "which will accrue to the portion [of property] not 
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to 
be condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff." This section has no express requirement that the 
view-impairing structure be built directly on the condemned land. Rather, it 
only requires that the severance damages be caused by the condemnation of, 
and use of. the property. 
Id. a t f | 17-18 (emphasis added). 
Based upon these principles, the Supreme Court made the following ruling: 
When land is condemned as part of a single project-even if the view-impairing 
structure itself is built on property other than that which was condemned-if the 
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use of the condemned property is essential to the completion of the project as 
a whole, the property owner is entitled to severance damages. Logically, if the 
project could not be built without taking the condemned land, the impairment 
of view caused by the completion of the project could and would not have 
arisen "but for" the condemnation. This is the very essence of cause. 
Id. at f 21 (emphasis added). 
The key facts noted by the Utah Supreme Court in the Ivers case are for all essential 
purposes identical to the facts in the present case: 
1. Both cases involved the taking of property that was an essential part of the 
overall project.1 
2. In both cases, the elevated roadway blocked the view from the remaining 
property. 
3. In neither case was the view offending structure constructed on the land taken. 
4. In both cases, the property taken was used by UDOT to construct an access 
road and other improvements related to the project that separated the damaged remainder 
property from the project improvements. 
These facts satisfy the Supreme Court's ultimate holding in Ivers that: 
With respect to lost view, severance damages are appropriate under Utah Code 
section 78-34-10 where a portion of property is condemned by the state and the 
condemnation of that land causes damage to the noncondemned portion of 
land. Damage to the noncondemned portion of land is "caused" by the 
severance... when the view-impairing structure is built on land other than the 
*It is undisputed that the taking of Admiral's property was necessary and essential 
for the 1-15 project. This is readily apparent in UDOT's own condemnation documents. 
(R. 673, 678-684). 
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condemned land, but the condemned land is used as part of a single project and 
that use is essential to completion of the project. 
Id. at f 26 (emphasis added). That is exactly what has occurred in this case. 
Despite the obvious similarities between the Ivers case and the present case, the trial 
court's December 27,2007 Minute Entry fails to even mention the Ivers decision. Moreover, 
the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of severance damages based on loss of view is 
in direct conflict with the Ivers decision.2 
B. The trial court's decision to exclude evidence of severance damages based 
on loss of view will allow UDOT to reap a windfall at Admiral's expense. 
The trial court's decision to eliminate the value of view from the property from fair 
market value provides a very significant windfall in the amount of that value to UDOT at 
Admiral's expense because that value was specifically included in the price Admiral paid for 
Lot 17 just two years previously, and for Lot 16 at the same time of the take. 
Mr. Webber made three separate appraisals of the properties in question. The first 
appraisal, concerning the fair market value of Lot 16 and Lot 17, was dated November 25, 
1994. Admiral purchased Lot 17 in March of 1995, based upon the fair market value as 
reflected in that appraisal. Mr. Webber made a second appraisal that concerned the fair 
market value of Lot 16 in October of 1997. Admiral purchased Lot 16 in July of 199 8, based 
upon the fair market value as reflected in that appraisal. See supra at 4-5, f l 7-10. 
2Admiral relied heavily on the Ivers decision in opposing UDOT's motion in 
limine. Thus, the trial court was aware of the decision and its binding affect on the 
present case. (R. 671-74, 761-63, 767, 994 at 32-33, 37-38.) 
12 
The harshness of the trial court's ruling is demonstrated by Admiral's purchase of the 
property for its appraised fair market value, which clearly included both the value of view 
and visibility, only to have UDOT take the property without paying any compensation for 
view or visibility. Thus, the substantial value representing both view and visibility are 
automatically shifted from Admiral to UDOT without a single dollar being paid as 
compensation. This violates the constitutional mandate that property not be taken without 
payment of just compensation. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 22; Southern Pac. Co. v. Arthur, 
352 P.2d 693,695 (Utah 1960) ('The standard of what is 'just compensation' in the ordinary 
case is the market value of the property taken, that is what a willing buyer would pay to a 
willing seller.").3 
C. It is impossible to segregate loss of view damages from Admiral's overall 
severance damage amount. 
In preparing his appraisal report, Mr. Webber determined Admiral's severance 
damages to the Remainder, based upon all of the factors that a prudent and willing buyer and 
seller, with knowledge of the facts, would take into account in arriving at fair market value, 
including but not limited to, view and visibility. Mr. Webber was unable despite extensive 
study and effort to identify comparable sales that did not take into account both view from 
3The Utah Court of Appeals' order granting Admiral permission to pursue an 
interlocutory appeal is limited to the issue of "[wjhether the trial court erred in excluding 
evidence of severance damages based on loss of view from the remaining property." (R. 
895.) Admiral believes that it has also been prejudiced by the trial court's order 
excluding evidence of severance damages based on the loss of visibility of the remaining 
property. That issue, however, may have to be addressed at a later date. 
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the property and visibility of the property from 1-15. View and visibility are critical factors 
that affect any piece of property along the 1-15 corridor. Any property located adjacent to 
1-15 will have a combination of both such values and it is impossible to allocate and assign 
a separate value to each. Licensed appraisers cannot speculate as to such values, which can 
vary widely from one property to another, and cannot be justified with true comparables 
generally used and accepted in appraisal practices. As a result, it is impossible to segregate 
out loss of view damages from Admiral's overall severance damage amount. 
Moreover, the trial court's Minute Entry is directly contrary to the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in State Road Comm'n v. Rohan. 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971). In Rohan, the 
State Road Commission took a position similar to the position espoused by UDOT in this 
case. The State argued that it was improper to permit the defendants' expert to take into 
consideration and testify concerning diminution in value resulting from increased noise from 
the highway. The Utah Supreme Court rejected the State's position and held that the 
testimony of the expert who considered the increase in noise was properly allowed, notwith-
standing the fact that it would have been improper to segregate and evaluate noise as a 
separate item of damage. The Rohan court held that 
there should not be any attempt to isolate and appraise as a separate item of 
damage any loss of value due to noise or any other such intangible factor; and 
this is true even where there has been an actual taking of property. Any such 
attempt to so segregate and place a separate money value on the effect the 
factor of noise would have upon property would inevitably involve the 
uncertainty and impracticability above referred to in this decision. This should 
not be done either for the purpose of making an award of a separate item of 
damage, as was dealt with in the Williams case, nor for the purpose of fixing 
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a separate amount to be deducted from the severance damage to the remaining 
property as plaintiff contends here. 
On the other hand, in order to correctly evaluate the severance damages, i.e., 
the damage to the remaining property, it is obvious that it should be viewed in 
the composite as it will be after the taking and after the improvement has been 
constructed. In making the appraisal it is not only permissible but necessary 
to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a prudent and willing buyer 
and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would take into account in arriving at 
its market value. The testimony of the defendant's expert which is here under 
attack indicates that he conformed to that formula. He properly and candidly 
included the facts that the new freeway adjacent to the property, with the 
attendant increase in traffic and noises, were among the factors considered in 
making his appraisal. But there was no attempt to segregate and place a 
separate money value thereon. We think the trial court was well advised in 
admitting his testimony and that no prejudicial error was committed. 
Id. at 859 (emphasis added). 
The same is true in this case. Mr. Webber properly considered loss of view as one of 
many factors that reduce the market value of Admiral's remaining property. The decrease 
in value resulting from loss of view cannot be segregated out and assigned a separate money 
value in assessing the total mix of factors that Mr. Webber considered. Mr. Webber stated 
as much in his affidavit. In fact, it would have been improper for Mr. Webber to attempt to 
segregate out a separate amount related to loss of visibility and deduct that amount from the 
overall severance damages. See Rohan, 487 P.2d at 859 ("This should not be done either for 
the purpose of making an award of a separate item of damage, . . . nor for the purpose of 
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fixing a separate amount to be deducted from the severance damage to the remaining 
property as plaintiff contends here.")-4 
D. The trial court was not bound by Judge Roth's Order. 
In its Minute Entry, the trial court referred to and specifically adopted Judge Roth's 
Order. (R. 862-63.) This was consistent with UDOT's argument that the Court was barred 
from considering evidence of severance damages related to loss of view and visibility as a 
result of the law of the case doctrine. In essence, UDOT argued that the Court was bound 
by Judge Roth's Order back in 2005. (R. 994 at 9, 23.) UDOT is wrong for the following 
reasons. 
First, Judge Roth's Order dated October 31,2005, predates the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Ivers v. Utah Dept. of Transp.. 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802, which essentially 
rewrote the rules regarding severance damages related to loss of view and visibility. The trial 
court should have decided UDOT's motions in limine based on the current law, not a prior 
trial judge's ruling or the law in effect in 2005. 
Moreover, trial courts have broad discretion and authority to reconsider and change 
their positions with respect to any interlocutory order so long as no final judgment has been 
entered. Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part as 
follows: "any order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer 
4Counsel for UDOT was extremely critical of the Utah Supreme Court's decision 
in Rohan, referring to it as an "embarrassment to the Court." (R. 994 at 48-49.) Despite 
counsel's personal opinion regarding the Supreme Court's decision, Rohan has never 
been overturned and remains binding case law. 
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than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights 
and liabilities of all the parties." 
In Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles. 2002 UT 48, 48 P.3d 968, a trial 
court reconsidered and reversed its interlocutory, non-final ruling granting summary 
judgment. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that "[t]rial courts have clear discretion 
to reconsider and change their position with respect to any orders or decisions as long as no 
final judgment has been rendered." Id. at f 18. Likewise in U.P.C.. Inc. v. R.O.A. General 
Inc.. 1999 UT App 303, 990 P.2d 945, the Utah Court of Appeals held that "[w]e have 
interpreted Rule 54(b) to allow 'a [trial] court to change its position with respect to any order 
or decision before a final judgment has been rendered in the case.'" Id. at f 55 (citing 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306,1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). 
Utah law in this regard is consistent with the law of other jurisdictions which 
recognize a trial court's right to amend its orders prior to the entry of a final judgment. See. 
e.g.. Bowman v. Songer. 820 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Colo. 1991) ("Until a final judgment is 
entered, a trial court has jurisdiction to hear such a motion to reconsider, and such a motion 
is not subject to the time constraints of Rule 59."); Teff v. Unity Health Plans Ins. Corp.. 666 
N.W.2d 38, 56-57 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) ("A court has the inherent authority to reconsider a 
nonfinal ruling any time prior to the entry of the final order or judgment."); Stephens v. Irvin. 
730 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) ("A trial court has the inherent power to 
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reconsider, vacate, or modify any previous order so long as the case has not proceeded to 
final judgment"); Sergent v. City of Charleston. 549 S.E.2d 311, 316 (W. Va. 2001) ("[a 
trial] court has plenary power to reconsider, revise, alter, or amend an interlocutory order."). 
Judge Roth's Order was clearly an interlocutory, non-final ruling. It was not a final 
judgment because it did not dispose of the case and end the subject matter of the litigation. 
See Bradbury v. Valencia. 2000 UT 50, 5 P.3d 649 ("For an order or judgment to be final, 
it 'must dispose of the case as to all the parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of 
the litigation on the merits of the case.'" Id. at f 9 (quoting Kennedy v. New Era Indus.. Inc.. 
600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979)). Thus, the trial court was not bound by Judge Roth's 
decision, especially to the extent that it was contrary to current law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Admiral's 
severance damages relating to loss of view from the remaining property. Therefore, the 
Court should reverse the trial court's December 27, 2007 Minute Entry and remand this 
matter for further proceedings consistent with the Court's ruling herein. 
DATED this ^ P * day of May, 2008. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Re^u L. Martineau 
Jason Hawkins 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH U H P A R - : 'F 
TRANSPORTATION 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
A D M I R A L B E V E R A G E 
CORPORATION (Assignee of Mark 
Investment Trust); PARK CITY WEST 
& ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK & 
TRUST COMPANY nka BANK ONE, 
UTAH; and VALLEY MORTGAGE 
COMPANY nka UTAH INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
UTAH D E P A R T M E N T OF 
TRANS' ;oR TATTON, 
vs. 
A D M I R A L B E V E R A G E 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") filed a Motion in Limine to which 
defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation ("Admiral") responded with a cross-motion, Motion in 
Limine of Defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect 
Fair Market Value ("Admiral's Motion in Limine"). While both motions are nominally focused on 
MEMORANDUM DECISION and 
ORDER (Cross-Motions in Limine) 
CONSOLIDATED: 
Case No. 970905361 CD 
Case No. 970905368CD 
j u d . - ' c ^ - . • • • ' ' -;•-
the parties' competing views of the admissibility of basically the same evidence, they recognize that 
the real issue is the scope of severance damages that may be awarded to defendants under Utah 
condemnation law. The parties submitted memoranda supporting their own motions and opposing 
their opponents, as well as reply memoranda. The court heard argument on the motions on June 28, 
2005, where UDOT was represented by Randy S. Hunter, Assistant Attorney General, and Admiral 
was represented by Rex E. Madsen (who argued) and Reed L. Martineau, Snow Christensen & 
Martineau. The court gave leave to Admiral to submit a new survey in response to one submitted 
by UDOT just before the hearing. That survey was provided to the court on August 31, 2005, and 
the matter was submitted for decision. Having considered the memoranda, affidavits and other 
evidence submitted, along with the arguments of counsel, the court GRANTS UDOT's Motion in 
Limine and DENIES Admiral's Motion in Limine, for the reasons set forth below. 
DECISION 
A. Factual Background. 
The relevant facts do not appear to be disputed in any material way. Admiral owns two 
adjacent lots directly to the west of the 1-15 freeway, bordering 500 West, which serves as a frontage 
road in that area, running north and south between the Admiral lots and the west side of the freeway. 
In connection with the 1-15 reconstruction project, the west side of the freeway in that area was 
moved closer to the Admiral lots, requiring that the 500 West frontage road also be moved further 
to the west and onto the east side of Admiral's property, resulting in the condemnation of what are 
now identified by UDOT as parcels 109 and 110, which are the subject of these consolidated cases. 
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Before reconstruction, the existing freeway lanes had an elevation about two feet higher than 
the surface of Admiral's property. I he reconstructed freeway is elevated consaeiai . > ;:_:,.:. *. \. 
;i port i«'ii) i A' the freeway wall reaching a height of about 28 feet at a point about six inches outside 
and to the west of the southeast corner of parcel 109, the former southeast corner of the Admiral 
condemnation.1 While 500 West was reconstructed on the taken parcels, no part of the rebuilt 
freeway itself is located on that property. 
condemnation for the taking of parcels 109 and I !-• .x mr. • appears to have onl> minimal 
disagreement that the deposited amount is a fair value foi the property taken, as \ alued on a square-
footage basis. The central issue is whether there are additional compensable severance damages to 
the remainder of Admiral's property. Based on the reports of its own expert appraisal witnesses, 
light, view, visibility and aesthetics, and (b) increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the 
reconstructed I-!.;- ireewnv " Admiral's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in Limine to 
\ d.i ' • W1-. . :* •:! "' actors I hat A ffect Fair 1\ larket Value and in Opposition to I 'laintiff s 
1
 Admiral originally argued that a portion of the freeway wall at issue was actually built 
within the southeast corner of parcel 109, based on UDOT engineering drawings that appeared to 
support such a conclusion. About two weeks before the hearing, however, UDOT submitted, 
through the Affidavit of Keith Hafen, a more detailed survey that showed the wall, at its nearest 
point, to be six inches outside of the condemned parcel 109. Subsequent to the hearing, Admiral had 
its own survey clone, which confirmed that the wall was outside of parcel 109, although four to live 
inches at its closest point rather than six, a difference that is not material to the issues before the 
court. 
.3. 
Motion in Limine ("Admiral's Memorandum in Support") at 2. UDOT contends that these rights 
are not compensable as severance damages under applicable law. 
B. Analysis. 
The factors identified by Admiral's appraisers as damaging the remaining property seem to 
fall into three categories: the loss of visibility and prominence of the remainder due to the size and 
location of the new freeway structures; loss of air and light to, and view from, the remaining 
property; and the increase in noise, dust, fumes and so on from increased traffic flow nearer to the 
remainder than the prior freeway. The claim for loss of visibility is the only subject addressed in 
UDOT's Motion in Limine, but all of these factors are addressed in Admiral's Motion in Limine, 
which is imposed in to to by UDOT. The loss of visibility issue is addressed separately as a matter 
of first impression in Utah. 
1. Loss of Visibility. 
There seems to be no dispute that reconstruction of the portion of I-15 passing by the Admiral 
property, which moved the freeway closer and significantly raised its grade, restricts the visibility 
of the remainder parcels from passing vehicles in comparison with the prior freeway configuration. 
The issue of whether reduced visibility is a compensable severance damage has not been directly 
addressed by Utah appellate courts. Nevertheless, the court believes that analogous Utah case law 
provides guidance in this area. 
A long line of Utah cases has established the principle that the appurtenant rights of an owner 
of abutting property do not include an interest in the traffic flow from a public road or highway 
passing by his property that justifies severance damages if reduced or taken away. In Hampton v. 
State Road Commission, 445 P.2d 708 (Utah 1968), the court noted that "the right of ingress or 
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egress to or from one's property [does not] include any right in and to existing public traffic on the 
highway, or any right to have such traffic pass by one's abullinu pinpcitv i < -ill ' I I I I1 " mint 
explained: 
The reason is that all traffic on public highways is controlled by the police power of 
the State, and what the police power may give an abutting property owner in the way 
of traffic on the highway it may take away, and by any such diversion of traffic the 
State and any of its agencies are not liable for any decrease of property values by 
reason of such diversion of traffic, because such damages are u damnum absque 
injuria? or damage without legal injury. 
Id ;a •• , t c . ... • .;\r :.,. .-, .. ..... - r:u • . .x id i ' I i I sh )p, 362 P.2d 580, 581 (I If ih 
1 % 1 I ("rI he owner of land abutting on a street or highway has no property or other vested right in 
the flow of traffic on that street or highway and is not entitled to compensation when that flow of 
tra"" • •* • >v *:- ••.'.> vLite Road Commission v. 
Miya, 526 P.2d 926,928 (Utah 1974) ("A property owner has no right to a free and unrestricted flow 
of traffic past his premises, and any impairment or interference with (Jus How docs mil cnlillc llic 
< • ' * • ' - . • »< - >i • iment oj Transportation v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT 10 7, 
1fl4 (citing Miya and quoting Hampton for the principle stated above). 
Here, a significant poilinii ol „ "\ t J i % m 11 • 11H % <, lainicd vu- iun ' i ' is IxitoJ on fhr irjfiftinn m 
visibility from the reconstructed freeway when compared to its original configuration. The visibility 
that was lost, under these circumstances, was necessarily a functk ;:.: I \ he passage of traffic, Ir ,. othei 
w •' • • * -'' *< ] % ' ^ construciion of the freeway by the State, 
which exposed the Admiral property to the view of passing motorists who used the freeway as a 
route of travel. Under existing Ian, it the State hail moo il ihc It ,o • .'lorizontalh r to a 
different locatic n for enough from the Admiral property that it traffic r*u ^nger passed by it, the 
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deprivation of the passing traffic itself would not be a compensable injury. It is difficult to see how 
moving the freeway vertically, so that traffic continues to pass by the property but without being able 
to see it, results in an injury that is any different as a practical matter or that is legally distinctive in 
any meaningful way. The court therefore does not believe that diminishment of visibility from a 
road or highway is any more compensable as severance damages than a more general diversion of 
traffic flow would be. 
Moreover, even if a right to visibility were found to be appurtenant to landowners abutting 
a highway or road, the rights of abutting owners with respect to a freeway are significantly more 
limited. 1-15 is a "[l]imited-access facility," which is defined by statute as "a highway especially 
designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to which neither owners nor occupants of abutting 
lands nor any other persons have any right or easement, or have only a limited right or easement of 
access, light, air, or view." U.C.A. § 72-1-102 (11). This definition suggests, among other things, 
an intent to restrict the appurtenant rights of lands abutting freeways so as to limit the scope of 
severance damages attributable to such rights. 
Admiral relies in part on People v. Ricardi, 144 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1944), and subsequent 
decisions following it, for the proposition that a landowner is entitled to severance damages for the 
loss of the view of his property from a highway. The California Court of Appeals, however, 
subsequently held that Ricardi 's "right to a view" does not apply to freeways. The court upheld the 
lower court's conclusion that an owner "has no legal right to a view of his property from the 
freeway:" 
A freeway is unlike a highway. An abutter/landowner has a right to a view from a 
public road or highway. However, while the purpose of a highway is to provide 
landowners with abutter's rights, the purpose of a freeway is to eliminate those rights. 
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People ex rel Department of Transportation v, Wilson, 31 CaI'.Rptr.2d 52, 55 (Cal.App. I*)94) 
(citation to Ricatt/i niniUul) "In1 emiri n i f J lh:ii lln1 | «u i ] "m s^«/ nl n uU »n highways is to allow 
access from abutting private property and to al low travelers along the road or highway " o \ V A a 
business , drive into it, patronize it, and reenter the h ighway" : , e 
a ia .^ .)ii - * ' - -.'v- . * : is designed to " 'p reven t jus t that sort of t h i n g / " 
Id. (citations omitted). The court went on to discuss a California statute similar in import to Utah ' s : 
For that reason, Streets and Highway Code section 23.5 provides that owners of 
abutting lands to a freeway have limited or no right of access to or from their abutting 
lands. Obviously a freeway restricts rights of access and related rights such as the 
right to a view. 
Id 
Therefore r v m if the court were inclined to find aright to a v i ew of one's abutting property 
from a road or highway under Utah law, the court concludes that a landowner "has no legal right to 
a v iew of his proper t> fit: :>! \ i the freew ay." 
2. Other Damages. 
Admiral also claims it is entitled to severance damages for " loss oil ,iu. l i g h t s ie A, HMIHIIIN 
and aesthetics " a bi indie of r ights that n ia> include, bi it goes beyond, the right to a view from the 
freeway, as well as for "increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the reconstructed I-15 
freeway, J he court conc lude . IIKII 1 'r.ili Lin does MM .illi. .v in u v n y lor MJHI .ilaiaiges un<ier i!ie 
ci rcumstances of these consolidated cases. 
The claimed damages appear to arise either from the elevation of the grade of the freeway 
or from, increased lr.il fit ilue li»f lie IVeew :\x improvements Mcillic r the construction of the elevated 
ramp or the reconstruction of the freeway itself, however, occurred on Admi ra l ' s property; the only 
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improvement constructed on Admiral's property was the relocation of the 500 West frontage road. 
Utah cases have been consistent in holding that severance damages are limited to those caused by 
the taking itself or attributable to improvements constructed on the taken property. The court in 
Miya, in finding compensable the loss of view from a remainder property caused by construction of 
a highway highway structure, noted that "the loss of view occasioned by a proposed public structure 
to be erected, in part at least, upon a parcel of property taken by condemnation from a unit" was a 
factor to be taken into account in determining severance damages. Miya, 526 P.2d at 929 (emphasis 
added). 
This precept was emphasized in Utah Dep 't of Transportation v. D 'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 
(Utah 1987), where the state took a private road to two residences, which it paved and made public 
in connection with a highway extension. The Court rejected the landowners' claim that they were 
entitled to severance damages from construction of the highway: 
The general rule is that damages attributable to the taking of others' property and the 
construction of improvements thereon are not compensable. Such damages suffered 
generally by all the property owners in the area are deemed consequential. 
Severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion of the parcel of 
property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on that part causes 
injury to that portion of the parcel not taken. 
Id. at 1221-22 (emphasis in the original). 
The court reemphasized its D 'Ambrosio holding in Harvey Real Estate, supra, an appeal of 
a trial court's grant of the state's motion in limine excluding certain severance damage evidence. 
In Harvey, the landowner sought severance damages for the diminution in value of its remainder 
property resulting from the closure of an intersection as part of a road project for which a portion of 
its land was taken. Similar to an argument Admiral makes here, the owner contended that the 
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intersection closure "was made possible only by the taking of Harvey's property " Harvey, 2002 
I! 1 1 1 0 J 1 1 1 2 IE Iarve> asserted that limiting severance damages to « " : " -^ -o^u II.IL ': -m 
improvements constructed at least in part on the portion of the ^ ;>rv lakcn conflicted with the . 
broad language of U.C.A. § 78-34-10(2), which provides for assessment of damages to a remainder 
manner proposed by the plaintiff [condemning authority]. The court disagreed: 
Section 78-34-10 gives a landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused 
by the construction of the improvement made on the severed property. It does not 
given the landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused by other facets 
of the construction project. 
• i i i ' 
We held essentially the same in Utah Department of 2 transportation v. D 'Ambrosio, 
743 P.2d 1220,1222 (Utah 1987), although we did not reference section 78-34-10(2). 
There we stated that "severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion 
of the parcel of property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on 
that part causes injury to that portion of the property not taken." (Emphasis added.) 
Our holding today also accords with the well-established common law principle that 
severance damages "may be made for any diminution in the value of [an owner's 
non-condemned land], as long as those damages were direc1:ly caused by the taking 
itself and by the condemnor's use of the land taken." 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain 
§ 368 (1996) (emphasis added) 
Id. at ffif 10-11 (interpolations and emphasis in the original, some citations omitted). 
The court therefore concludes that damages resulting from construction of the elevated ramp 
the reconstruction project are r• • -i compensable as severance damages under Utah law. This appears 
to include evidence ic.aic^ ,. ... \ :ne components ofseveran.ee damages" that were "taken into 
.9. 
A. Steele and paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of John C. Brown (Exhibits A and B, respectively, to 
Admiral's Memorandum in Support), except for "loss of parking."2 
ORDER 
It is therefore ORDERED that UDOT's Motion in Limine is GRANTED, and Admiral's 
Motion in Limine to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value is DENIED. 
DATED this _£[__ day of October, 2005. 
2
 The facts of this case illustrate the sometimes arbitrary nature of the rule that the court has 
relied on in making its decision here. Without so finding, it is certainly possible that the court's 
decision would have been significantly different if the offending elevated freeway ramp had been 
built six inches within, rather than six inches outside, the condemned parcel 109. In this regard 
Admiral has advanced an argument that has special appeal given the harsh result the difference of 
a matter of inches may produce. That argument proposes that if a taking is part of an integrated 
project (which Admiral argues is the case here), the landowner should be entitled to compensation 
for damages resulting from specific improvements related to the purpose of the taking and causing 
specific injury to the remainder, even if they were not constructed within the immediate boundaries 
of the take. See Admiral Beverage Corporation's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion in 
Limine . . ., at 6-10. This approach recognizes that the actual reduction in value of the remainder 
from the improvement, as a practical matter, may be no different when it is located just within or just 
outside of the taken parcel. 
The court believes, however, that the repeated (and apparently unequivocal) holdings of the 
Utah Supreme Court, as addressed above, constrain it from seriously considering such an approach 
at this level, because it would involve a departure from current law. In this regard, the appellate 
courts are better equipped to identify, analyze and resolve the competing public and private interests, 
as well as the legal complications, that would be implicated in such a change in approach to 
severance damages. The resolution of these issues must therefore be left to some future appeal. 
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MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 970905361 
970905368 
(Consolidated) 
UDOT" s Motions in Limine on the issue of view and visibility and 
concerning Jerry R. Weber's testimony on the subject of severance damages 
caused by loss of view and visibility was heard by the Court on December 
18, 2007, at 10:00 a.m. After hearing arguments thereon, review of the 
pleadings and a specific review of the Decision dated October 31st, 2005 
issued by Judge Roth in this case, che Court grants UDOT7s Motions in 
Limine. The Court also refers the parties to Judge Roth's decision and 
adopts the same here. 
Defendant is able to assert claims for any severance damages 
relating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner 
to 500 West. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this 24th day of December, 2007. 
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